Compliance posture
What Precision has built — and what it has not.
Precision is a release-coordination and change-evidence tool built for organisations whose production changes have to be authorised, attributable and auditable. This page maps the controls the product ships today onto the clauses a supervised financial institution in Switzerland or Germany screens a vendor against, and states plainly where the gaps are.
1. Read this first
Precision is a pre-1.0 product in closed beta. It holds no certifications and no external assurance reports. Rather than leave a procurement questionnaire to infer that from silence, here is the explicit list.
What Precision does not have
No certification, no audit, no assurance report.
- No ISO/IEC 27001 certification. The Annex A mapping in section 8 describes product controls designed against the standard, not a certified ISMS.
- No SOC 2 report, Type I or Type II. SOC 2 Type II is a stated intention, not an achieved state.
- No external security audit and no penetration test.
- No security monitoring and no on-call rotation, and therefore no ICT-incident notification SLA.
- No data protection officer appointed, and no EU or Swiss representative designated.
- No contractual data-residency guarantee, and no Switzerland-region hosting option.
- No documented backup or restore procedure. Under GDPR Art. 32(1)(c) that is a control gap, not a paperwork one, and it is stated here rather than buried.
- No incorporated legal entity to contract with as a processor-agreement counterparty. An individual stands in as controller for the public website and mailing list in the meantime — see the privacy notice, section 1.2 — and will be replaced by that entity before any customer instance goes live commercially.
- No customers named, no statistics quoted, no testimonials. Nothing on this site is a reference claim.
Everything below describes controls designed against the named frameworks and, where marked as shipped, built into the product. None of it is a statement of certified compliance, and no wording on this page should be read as one.
The written data-protection pack behind section 6 — processor agreement template, sub-processor register, retention statement, breach-notification commitment and residency statement — is an engineering draft. It has not been reviewed by a qualified data-protection adviser and must not be relied on in a contract until it has been.
2. How to read the tables
Every control table below carries the same statuses used in Precision's internal clause-by-clause mapping. They are reproduced here unflattened, because the difference between them is the whole point of the page.
- Shipped
- Built and in the product today.
- Verified
- Shipped and covered by a passing test or an external audit finding. No row on this page carries this status, because no external audit has taken place.
- In progress
- Partly built. Each row names what is still missing.
- Planned
- Not built. A roadmap item, not a capability. Do not score it as one.
- N/A
- Outside Precision's scope — the control belongs to the customer or to another system.
- Repealed
- The provision itself is no longer in force. The row is kept because vendor questionnaires still cite it by name, not because it is an obligation Precision should be scored against.
Where a row is more limited than its heading suggests, the limitation is written into the row rather than left for a follow-up call.
3. Controls shipped today
The short version, before the clause tables. Each of these is in the product now; the sections that follow say which clauses they answer and which they do not.
| Control | What it is | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Release sign-off | A dedicated, non-terminal signed state between planned and completed, gated by its own permission that is separate from the permission to plan a release. Signing captures the signer's printed-name snapshot, the date and time, a required statement of what the signing means, and a deterministic hash binding the signature to the release's signable state. There is no path from planned straight to completed. Sign-off can be withdrawn; the withdrawal is recorded, the signature record is not deleted. | Shipped |
| Tamper-evident activity log | An application-immutable log of who did what, to which release or event, through which channel (UI, REST API or MCP), and when. Every row is a link in an append-only SHA-256 hash chain; a verify command walks the chain, recomputes every hash and exits non-zero on the first broken link. An --expect-head option checks the current head against an externally recorded anchor, so tail truncation outside the application is detectable too. |
Shipped |
| Evidence export | A self-contained archive per release — a human-readable PDF plus machine-ingestible JSON — carrying release metadata, every lifecycle event, sign-off evidence, and the full release activity log with each row's hash, previous hash and canonical serialisation. An auditor can verify the hash chain offline, without a Precision login. | Shipped |
| Instance-anchored packet signature — opt-in, off by default | An exported packet can be signed with a per-instance RSA key. When the operator configures one, the packet carries a detached RS256 signature over its canonical JSON and the public half is served at a well-known endpoint on the instance, so an auditor can verify offline that the packet was issued by that instance and not altered since. Signing is off unless a key is configured: an unconfigured instance exports unsigned packets and the well-known endpoint returns 404. Do not read this row as a property of every packet you will be handed. | Shipped |
| Instance-per-tenant isolation | Each customer runs a dedicated deployment with a dedicated database on a dedicated subdomain, with per-instance generated secrets. Customer data does not co-reside in a shared store, so a tenant-scoping defect cannot expose another customer's data. | Shipped |
| Role-based access control | Project-scoped membership with three roles and a granular permission set, enforced by permission gates across the UI, the REST API and the MCP surface. One deliberate exception, disclosed because a security reviewer will find it: instance administrators — an operator-configured list of administrator email addresses, not a project role — short-circuit every permission check and therefore hold every permission on every project, including sign-off, whether or not they are a member of it. There is no way to scope an administrator down to a subset of projects. | Shipped |
| Federated authentication only | Sign-in is delegated to the customer's identity provider over OAuth or OIDC. Precision stores no passwords at all, so there is no password database to breach. SAML 2.0 is not yet available (see section 4). | Shipped |
| Configurable log retention | An operator-configurable activity-log retention window with a scheduled prune command. The default is to never prune, so an instance keeps its full audit history until the operator chooses a window. | Shipped |
| Supply-chain controls on the build | New npm package versions are quarantined for 72 hours before they can be installed, and package install scripts are disabled entirely. Transitive high-severity advisories have been resolved and released in under a day. | Shipped |
4. DORA — the lighthouse regulation
Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector, in force 17 January 2025. DORA leads Precision's mapping for three reasons: it is the broadest current EU regime covering ICT change management in financial services; its Article 28 makes Precision itself a regulated ICT third-party provider the moment it is sold into a financial entity, which forces exit, sub-processor and incident obligations onto the product rather than only onto the contract; and alignment with it largely subsumes the EBA ICT guidelines, BaFin BAIT and FINMA Circular 2023/1.
That is the deliberate difference from vendors whose published mappings target product-security and US-federal frameworks. Precision's frame is change management under European financial supervision.
Article 8 — Identification
| Clause | Control and Precision's answer | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 8(1) | Identify and document ICT-supported business functions. Precision's project and release inventory is intended to be the system of record for in-flight change; it is not yet built as an identification control. | Planned |
| Art. 8(4) | Maintain inventories of ICT assets. Out of scope — Precision references an asset inventory, it does not own one. | N/A |
Article 9 — Protection and prevention
| Clause | Control and Precision's answer | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 9(3)(a) | Strong authentication for ICT operations. Shipped: federated sign-in over OAuth and OIDC, with no password storage at all. Not built: SAML 2.0 as a service provider, and MFA step-up at the moment of sign-off. A DE/CH enterprise IT security review that mandates SAML will not be satisfied today. | In progress |
| Art. 9(4)(b) | Policies limiting access on a need-to-know basis. Shipped: per-project membership, three roles, granular project-scoped permissions, and a dedicated sign-off permission held separately from the permission to plan a release. Not built: broader system-enforced segregation of duties, such as a template flag forbidding self-approval. Not need-to-know either: instance administrators bypass project scoping entirely and hold every permission on every project, including sign-off, regardless of membership (see section 3). | In progress |
Article 10 — Detection
| Clause | Control and Precision's answer | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 10(1) | Detect anomalous activity. Shipped: the per-release activity log with its interaction channel and hash chain. Not built: a read-only auditor role, and any form of security monitoring or alerting — detection here means an after-the-fact record, not a live control. | In progress |
ICT change management
This is the table the product exists for, and the one where the distinction between shipped and planned matters most.
| Control | Precision's answer | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Tamper-evident audit trail | Append-only activity log in which every row is a link in an in-database SHA-256 hash chain, ordered by id, with a unique previous-hash constraint that forbids forks. A verify command recomputes the chain and fails on the first broken link. | Shipped |
| Pre-flight evidence bundle | A self-contained evidence packet (PDF + JSON, plus a detached instance signature when the operator has configured a signing key — see section 3) covering the release, its lifecycle events, sign-off evidence and the full activity log with row hashes. Shipped as an on-demand export for any release. Gap: it is on-demand only — no snapshot is taken automatically when sign-off completes. | In progress |
| Documented authorisation before production change | Per-event sign-off bound to a stakeholder role, with the release locked once the required sign-offs are signed. Neither per-event signing nor locking exists. See the note below for what is shipped at release level. | Planned |
| Risk-rated changes | A change category on the release (standard / normal / emergency) driving which sign-offs are required. | Planned |
| Segregation of duties | Creator ≠ approver ≠ deployer, enforced by a template flag forbidding self-approval and by role-based sign-off binding. The permission split between planning and signing is shipped; the enforcement above it is not. | Planned |
| Emergency change with retroactive review | An emergency category with a timer-driven follow-up review. | Planned |
| Change freeze enforcement | Per-project blackout windows that block release scheduling without an exception sign-off. | Planned |
| Pre-deployment evidence linkage | First-class evidence types (pull request, CI run, scan, ticket, attachment) attached per sign-off. | Planned |
What authorisation looks like today
Release-level sign-off is shipped and is the mandatory production gate: a release cannot go from planned to completed without passing through the signed state, the signing permission is separate from the planning permission, and the signature carries a printed-name snapshot, a timestamp, a required statement of meaning and a hash binding it to the record state at signing time.
Two limits, stated because an auditor will find them anyway. First, a signed release record stays editable, and nothing blocks the edit. Drift after signing is provable by recomputing the stored record-state hash offline — nothing in the product recomputes or flags it, so that comparison is the auditor's own step — and most, though not all, of the individual edits are itemised in the activity log: release-notes changes are deliberately not logged, even though the notes are part of the state the signature hashes. A notes edit after signing therefore changes the signed record and leaves no activity-log row behind. Second, signing is per release, not per lifecycle event. Per-event signatures and record locking are the planned rows above.
Article 28 — Precision as an ICT third-party provider
These are obligations on Precision as a vendor rather than features of the product, and they are the weakest part of the posture today.
| Clause | Control and Precision's answer | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 28(2) | Strategy and policy on the use of ICT third-party providers. This page and the written pack behind it are the buyer-facing artefact; the pack is drafted and pending data-protection review. | In progress |
| Art. 28(3)(b) | Termination rights and exit plan. Return and deletion on termination are drafted in the processor agreement template, and per-release evidence export is shipped as a data-out surface. Gaps: there is no exit plan and no documented backup or restore procedure. | In progress |
| Art. 28(7) | Sub-processor list and change notification. A register exists (section 12) with a proposed 30-day change-notification commitment. Gap: the notification channel is not defined. | In progress |
| Art. 28(8) | Incident reporting commitments. A personal-data breach notification path is drafted. There is no ICT-incident SLA, no monitoring and no on-call; an incident-notification commitment is a roadmap item, not an offer. | Planned |
5. EBA guidelines, BaFin BAIT and FINMA 2023/1
All three land on the same control: a documented, approved, risk-assessed change process applied to ICT systems. Precision's answer to each is the DORA change-management table in section 4 — the same shipped controls, the same gaps. No separate clause-level mapping is maintained for them, because DORA's is stricter and subsumes them.
Two of the three rows below are no longer live obligations for a DORA-scoped buyer. The EBA provision has been deleted outright, and BAIT excludes institutions that run ICT risk management under DORA. Both are kept because vendor questionnaires still ask for them by name, but the live requirement in each case is DORA's, mapped in section 4. Details under the table.
| Source | Clause and Precision's answer | Status |
|---|---|---|
| EBA/GL/2019/04 (deleted) |
§ 3.6.3 ICT change management (para. 75) — all changes to ICT systems are recorded, tested, assessed, approved, implemented and verified in a controlled manner, with adequate safeguards for changes made during emergencies. Para. 76 adds that the institution determines whether a change affects existing security measures or requires additional ones. Deleted by EBA/GL/2025/02, which applies from 20 May 2025: “Paragraphs 1 to 91 which correspond to Sections 3.1 to 3.7 are deleted.” The EBA reduced the guidelines' scope to Guideline 3.8 because DORA and its ICT risk-management RTS cover the subject matter. Retained here only for reviewers whose questionnaire still cites it; the live requirement is DORA's, answered by the change-management table in section 4. | Repealed |
| BaFin BAIT (DE) | IT-Betrieb, Tz. 8.4–8.5 — processes for changing IT systems, scaled to the nature, scale, complexity and risk of the change, with changes documented, assessed for implementation risk, prioritised, approved, and implemented in a coordinated and secure manner. Answered by the DORA change-management table. | In progress |
| FINMA Circular 2023/1 (CH) | Operational risk, change management — a documented, risk-assessed change process for ICT systems. Answered by the DORA change-management table; risk rating of changes is a planned row there. | In progress |
One point in Precision's favour that is easy to miss: BAIT carves itself out for exactly this buyer. Its preamble (Rundschreiben 10/2017 (BA), Fassung 16.12.2024, Tz. 1) states that the circular's scope follows AT 2.1 MaRisk, and that from 17 January 2025 institutions that must operate ICT risk management under Art. 5–15 or Art. 16 of DORA are excluded from it. That is an exclusion from the circular's scope, not a repeal: BAIT has no expiry clause, and Tz. 3 preserves MaRisk alongside it. For an institution that must run ICT risk management under those DORA articles, BAIT does not apply from 17 January 2025 and the corresponding obligations sit in DORA instead, so section 4 is the whole answer. The row above is kept for institutions outside that carve-out and for reviewers whose questionnaire still asks.
6. GDPR and Swiss nFADP
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP, SR 235.1, in force 1 September 2023) apply to every customer, independent of financial supervision.
Who is who. Precision is sold as an instance per customer. The customer is the controller for everything inside their instance — their users, projects, releases, attachments and activity log. Precision is the processor for that data, acting on the customer's documented instructions. Separately, Precision is the controller for its own public website and mailing list. The full statement is the privacy notice.
| Clause | Control and Precision's answer | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 13/14; nFADP Art. 19 | Information to data subjects at collection. A public privacy notice covering controller identity, data categories, purposes and legal bases, recipients, retention, rights and transfers is published; for the website and mailing list, the controller is named as an individual standing in ahead of incorporation. Gap: no legal entity exists yet to take over that role or to contract with. | In progress |
| Art. 22; nFADP Art. 21 | Automated individual decision-making. There is none. Every release decision the product records — planning, sign-off, completion — is taken by a named human and attributed to them. | Shipped |
| Art. 15–21; nFADP Art. 25, 28, 32 | Access, rectification, erasure, restriction, portability, objection. Exercised by the controller through the product; per-release evidence export doubles as a portability surface. Documented limit: activity-log rows and sign-off records are append-only, which constrains what erasure can mean for them. | In progress |
| Art. 28(3); nFADP Art. 9 | Controller-to-processor agreement. A DPA template covering instructions, confidentiality, security, sub-processors, rights assistance, return and deletion, and audit is drafted, with a technical-and-organisational-measures annex. Pending legal review. | In progress |
| Art. 30(2); nFADP Art. 12(3) | Processor record of processing activities. Not created. | Planned |
| Art. 32(1)(a); nFADP Art. 8 | Encryption and pseudonymisation. HSTS on every response, encrypted session cookies in production, encrypted digest and webhook secrets at rest, and no password storage at all. Gaps: database-connection TLS is unverified on production instances, and volume encryption at rest is unverified. | In progress |
| Art. 32(1)(b) | Confidentiality and integrity. Instance-per-tenant isolation with a dedicated database per customer, per-project role-based permission gates, and the tamper-evident activity log. | Shipped |
| Art. 32(1)(c) | Ability to restore availability after an incident. A supervised runtime with a container health check exists. Gap: there is no documented backup or restore procedure. | In progress |
| Art. 32(1)(d) | Regular testing and evaluation of measures. Log-integrity verification and a CI quality gate exist. Gaps: no penetration test, no security monitoring, no on-call. | In progress |
| Art. 5(1)(e); nFADP Art. 6(4) | Storage limitation. An operator-configurable activity-log retention window with a scheduled prune command; the default keeps rows indefinitely until the operator sets a window. | Shipped |
| Art. 33(2); nFADP Art. 24(3) | Processor notifies the controller without undue delay. A 24-hour notification target with the Art. 33(3) content requirements and phased updates is drafted. Gap: no contact path is defined on either side. | In progress |
| Art. 44–49; nFADP Art. 16/17 | International transfers. The analysis frame is documented, including adequacy between the EEA and Switzerland in both directions. Cloudflare and GitLab are verified DPF-certified for EEA, UK and Swiss transfers; Resend is DPF-certified for the EEA/UK leg only. Gap: a Swiss transfer basis for Resend is not yet confirmed. | In progress |
7. NIS2
Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Precision maintains no clause-level NIS2 mapping, and presenting one would be an overclaim. What exists is a set of supply-chain and logging practices that answer the kind of question a NIS2-scoped buyer asks of a supplier:
- Build supply chain. New npm package versions are quarantined for 72 hours before they can enter a build, and package install scripts are disabled outright. Shipped
- Patch cadence. Demonstrated rather than promised: three high-severity transitive advisories in one framework were resolved and released in under a day. Shipped
- Logging and traceability. The tamper-evident activity log in section 3. Shipped
- Vendor security posture statement and incident-notification SLA. Neither exists. This is a known roadmap item and the honest answer to a NIS2 supplier questionnaire today is "not yet". Planned
8. ISO/IEC 27001:2022
Precision is not ISO 27001 certified and holds no Statement of Applicability. The organisational Annex A controls — governance, HR, supplier management — belong to an operating organisation's ISMS, and no such organisation has been incorporated. What can honestly be mapped is the subset of Annex A that the product implements.
| Annex A | Control and Precision's answer | Status |
|---|---|---|
| A.5.15 | Access control — per-project role-based access and permission gates. | In progress |
| A.5.16 | Identity management — federated identity linking with unique user records. SAML is not available. | In progress |
| A.5.17 | Authentication information — scoped personal access tokens for API use. MFA step-up at sign-off is not built. | In progress |
| A.8.16 | Monitoring activities — the per-release activity log. | Shipped |
| A.8.32 | Change management — answered by the DORA change-management table in section 4. | In progress |
9. SOC 2, PCI-DSS and SOX ITGC
Secondary frameworks that appear on questionnaires even when they are not the buyer's primary regime.
SOC 2
No SOC 2 report exists. Type II is a stated intention alongside the product build, not an achieved state, and no audit period has been observed. The product-side criteria that would be in scope are logical access controls, user authorisation before access, authentication, system monitoring, and change management — all of which are the same controls mapped in sections 4 and 8, with the same shipped/planned split. The one criterion answered by a shipped control is system monitoring and anomaly detection, via the hash-chained activity log.
PCI-DSS v4.0
In scope only when a customer's own system handles cardholder data. Precision itself processes no cardholder data.
Requirement 6.5.1 is the one that maps: changes to all system components in the production environment are made according to established procedures. It carries six bullets, and Precision answers them unevenly — two are partly answered, three are roadmap items, and one is outside what the product does at all:
- Reason for, and description of, the change. Partly answered: release-level sign-off requires the signer to state a reason, and the hash-chained activity log records the change. In progress
- Documentation of security impact. Risk classification of changes is a roadmap item. Planned
- Documented change approval by authorized parties. Partly answered: the signing permission is held separately from the planning permission, and the signature record names the signer and the time. Per-event approval and MFA step-up at signing are roadmap items. In progress
- Testing to verify that the change does not adversely impact system security. Evidence linkage per sign-off is a roadmap item. Planned
- For bespoke and custom software changes, all updates are tested for compliance with Requirement 6.2.4 before being deployed into production. Precision does not test software changes for secure-coding compliance and does not gate a release on such a test. This is a control over the customer's own build and review pipeline, not something Precision provides or enforces. N/A
- Procedures to address failures and return to a secure state. Precision records a release and its rollout events but has no rollback or failure-handling workflow. Planned
Requirement 6.5.2 — upon completion of a significant change, all applicable PCI DSS requirements are confirmed to be in place on all new or changed systems and networks, and documentation is updated as applicable — is the one requirement outside 6.5.1 that Precision partly supports. Confirming a set of requirements after a change is what a release checklist is, and keeping the record updated is what a release record is. Precision supplies neither the PCI requirement list nor any verification that the confirmation is truthful: the customer defines the checklist and the evidence. In progress
Requirements 6.5.3 (pre-production environments separated from production, enforced with access controls) and 6.5.4 (roles and functions separated between production and pre-production to provide accountability such that only reviewed and approved changes are deployed) are controls over the customer's own environments. Precision neither provides nor enforces them, and claiming them as roadmap items would misrepresent what the product is for. N/A
SOX ITGC
Relevant to customers with US-listed parents. The change-management control area — authorised, tested, documented, segregated changes — is answered by the DORA table. The logical-access area is answered by federated SSO and per-project roles; periodic access review has no dedicated UI and is a planned item.
10. Annex 11 and GAMP 5 — the pharma horizon
EU GMP Annex 11 and GAMP 5 are an adjacent, horizon market for Precision, not its primary target. Nothing here is offered as a validated-system claim, and Precision has not been validated for GMP use by anyone. Three Annex 11 clauses are nevertheless in reach of controls that already exist, because the DORA-driven design happens to run alongside them — one fully, one only in part, one not at all:
- § 14 — electronic signatures. The clause asks for three things: that the signature have the same impact as a handwritten signature within the company, that it be permanently linked to the respective record, and that it carry the time and date of signing. Precision ships the third outright, and answers the second evidentially rather than preventively: a deterministic hash over the release's signable state binds the signature to what was signed, but the signed record stays editable and nothing in the product recomputes or flags drift — the link proves what was signed, it does not hold the record still (see the note in section 4). The first item is not a product property at all; it is the customer's to establish in their own quality system. A note on what is not an Annex 11 § 14 requirement: the sign-off also requires the signer to state what the signing means. That is a signature manifestation under 21 CFR Part 11 § 11.50, and Part 11 is explicitly out of Precision's scope — it is a capability, not a clause answered here. In progress
- § 9 — audit trails. The append-only, hash-chained activity log, plus the per-release evidence packet an auditor can verify offline. Shipped
- Periodic review of audit trails. There is no workflow for an accountable role to record that a periodic log review happened. The log is reviewable; the attestation that it was reviewed is not a product feature. Planned
- GAMP 5 supplier documentation package — user requirements, functional and configuration specifications, risk assessment, supplier audit support. None of it exists. It would be produced on a horizon buyer's demand, and IQ/OQ/PQ remains the customer's. Planned
11. Where the data sits
The honest answers, in the order a vendor-risk reviewer asks them.
| Question | Answer today | Status |
|---|---|---|
| EU / EEA-only option? | Probably, but unconfirmed. Instances run on virtual servers from Hetzner Online GmbH — a German company that operates datacentres in several countries, which is a different question from where the data sits. The region is a per-instance provisioning choice and the region actually used has not been confirmed. No EU-residency guarantee can be given until it is. This is the single most load-bearing unknown in the posture. | In progress |
| Switzerland-only option? | No. Not available today, and not a configuration flag. Extending the provisioner to a Swiss region is scoped work, activated on buyer demand, with a delivery timeline rather than a checkbox. | Planned |
| Customer data in a shared database? | No. Dedicated deployment, dedicated database, dedicated subdomain and per-instance secrets per customer. Attachments sit on the same instance volume, not in object storage elsewhere. | Shipped |
| Does instance traffic cross a CDN? | No. Tenant subdomains are DNS-only records; their traffic is not proxied through an edge network. The public marketing site is separate and holds no customer data. | Shipped |
| Does anything leave on Precision's initiative? | Yes, in one narrow case: unhandled exceptions are reported to a hosted error-tracking service. The payload carries the authenticated user's numeric ID only — no name, no email — with the stack trace, release tag and server name, retained 90 days. It can be switched off per instance by leaving the reporting DSN empty. The storage region of that service is unconfirmed. | In progress |
| Does anything leave through customer-configured channels? | Yes, and where it goes is the customer's choice. Project digests can be delivered by email to project members, to a customer-supplied webhook URL, or to a Discord webhook. Email recipients are the project's current members, resolved live at send time — there is no snapshotted recipient list, so membership changes take effect on the next send. With the recent-activity section enabled the payload carries acting users' names. The webhook destination is not required to be HTTPS, so transport encryption on that hop is the controller's responsibility. Digest channels are opt-in per project; leaving them unconfigured keeps this egress closed. | Shipped |
| Contractual residency guarantee? | None offered. One cannot be until the hosting region is confirmed and the backup question is answered — and any such guarantee would cover only what Precision controls, not the destinations a customer configures for itself. | Planned |
| On-premises or customer-cloud deployment? | Not offered. The product ships as a container image with a host-agnostic runtime contract, so it is technically feasible — but it is not a supported, priced option, and until it is, it is not a residency answer. | Planned |
12. Sub-processors
Five third parties are involved in delivering Precision. The full register — data categories, legal entity, location and contract status per provider — forms an annex to the processor agreement and is available with it.
| Provider | What it does |
|---|---|
| Hetzner Online GmbH | Virtual servers running each customer's dedicated instance and its database. All instance data lives here. |
| Cloudflare, Inc. | DNS for the domain and delivery of this public website. Tenant records are DNS-only, so customer traffic is not proxied. |
| GitLab Inc. | Error tracking for unhandled exceptions — numeric user ID and stack trace, 90-day retention. |
| Bunny Fonts | Webfont delivery inside the authenticated application UI, which discloses the user's IP address and user agent to that provider. This public site does not use it — its fonts are self-hosted so that no third party sits in front of a visitor here. |
| Resend | Delivery of waiting-list mailing-list email — the double opt-in confirmation link and the unsubscribe link. Recipient: the address the visitor submitted. |
One further browser-side disclosure that is not a sub-processor, stated here because a reviewer will ask and because a customer who does not want it should hear about it before rollout rather than after. Once a user is signed in, the authenticated application renders their profile picture straight from the URL their identity provider supplied at sign-in. The user's browser therefore discloses its IP address and user agent to that provider's avatar host on every page load — the same disclosure class as the webfont entry above. The identity provider is the customer's own choice and does not process data on Precision's behalf, which is why it is not in the table; the disclosure is real regardless.
Three US-incorporated companies are in that list — Hetzner and Bunny Fonts are both EU-incorporated (Germany and Slovenia respectively). Corporate location is a distinct question from data location, and both matter: a US parent may be subject to US legal process regardless of where bytes sit. Checked against the official Data Privacy Framework list on 16 September 2026:
| Provider | Transfer mechanism |
|---|---|
| Cloudflare, Inc. | Certified under the EU-U.S. DPF, the UK Extension, and the Swiss-U.S. DPF (participant record). Covers EEA, UK and Swiss transfers. |
| GitLab Inc. | Certified under the EU-U.S. DPF, the UK Extension, and the Swiss-U.S. DPF (participant record). Covers EEA, UK and Swiss transfers. |
| Resend | Certified under the EU-U.S. DPF and the UK Extension only (participant record) — not the Swiss-U.S. DPF. Resend's DPA additionally incorporates the EU Standard Contractual Clauses, which cover the EEA transfer independently of DPF status; a transfer from Switzerland still needs a separate basis under nFADP Art. 16/17, which has not yet been confirmed for this sub-processor. |
Changes to the register carry a proposed 30-day advance notification commitment. The channel for that notification is not yet defined.
13. Using this page in a vendor security questionnaire
This page is public, needs no login, and has a
stable address at
https://precisionrelease.org/compliance.
It is written to be cited directly in a
questionnaire response, and the section anchors
are stable enough to link to.
The documents behind it — the processor agreement template with its technical-and-organisational-measures annex, the sub-processor register, the retention statement, the breach-notification commitment and the residency statement — are maintained alongside the product's source and are available on request. They are engineering drafts pending data-protection review; treat them as disclosure of the current position, not as warranties.
There is no dedicated business enquiries address yet, because no legal entity has been incorporated to own one. The contact named in the privacy notice, section 1.2, is an individual standing in ahead of that — route questions there, or through the contact you already have with the project.
This page is versioned with the product. It is updated in the same change that alters a control it describes, which is also why every row above names its limits rather than its aspirations.